STOP US BEFORE WE SPEND AGAIN: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING

A distributive politics model establishes that the presence of exogenously enforceable spending limits reduces spending and that the effect of executive veto authority is contingent on whether spending is capped and whether the chief executive is a liberal or conservative. Surprisingly, when spending limits are in place, governments with conservative executives spend more than those with more liberal chief executives. Limits are welfare improving, as is the executive veto when it leads to the building of override coalitions. Using 32 years of US state budget data, this paper also establishes empirically that strict balanced budget rules constrain spending and also lead to less pronounced short-term responses to fluctuations in a state's economy. Party variables like divided government and party control of state legislatures tend to have little or no direct effect, with political institutions and economic indicators explaining much of the variation in state spending.     

Symposium on Public Policy Issues in Finance

The thesis of this symposium, organized by James Bicksler, was that while finance theory will surely inform practitioners, it seems appropriate to pay some attention to the opposite flow: practitioners can inform theory. Contributors include a distinguished group of practitioners with extensive backgrounds in economics, and economists with extensive public policy experience: Martin Feldstein, Robert Glauber, David Mullins, and Steven Wallman. Their topics range from privatizing social security, to managing market crashes, to the regulatory agency cost problem, to regulatory constraints in a technologically advanced world.     

Chaos and Nonlinear Dynamics: Application to Financial Markets

After the stock market crash of October 19, 1987, interest in nonlinear dynamics, especially deterministic chaotic dynamics, has increased in both the financial press and the academic literature. This has come about because the frequency of large moves in stock markets is greater than would be expected under a normal distribution. There are a number of possible explanations. A popular one is that the stock market is governed by chaotic dynamics. What exactly is chaos and how is it related to nonlinear dynamics? How does one detect chaos? Is there chaos in financial markets? Are there other explanations of the movements of financial prices other than chaos? The purpose of this paper is to explore these issues.     

Book Reviews

Technological Collaboration in Industry; strutegy, policy and internationalization in innovation
Corporate Venturing: Creating New Businesses within the Firm
Handbook of Innovation Management
Technology and enterprise in a historical perspective
Intellectual Property for Engineers
The Ernst & Young Business Plan Guide
crnagement as a New Technology
Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition     

Is it an offence to overcharge?

This paper considers whether a trader commits an offence when he makes a mistake and overcharges a customer. It examines the offences found in section 20 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 - as defined in section 21(1)(a) - and looks at the effect of a recent decision of the appeal courts.     

A Labour Monopolies Commission to Reduce Unemployment

Mr Tebbitt's proposals to reduce union obstructiveness have not taken account of their power as monopoly suppliers of labour. A pressing priority for the current session of Parliament should be the introduction of legislation to eradicate legal privilege which does not reflect market reality.